



January 9, 2026

Indiana Senate  
Attn: Senate Committee on Education and Career Development  
200 W Washington St.  
Indianapolis, IN 46204

## Re: SB 199 – "Various Education Matters" (Oppose)

Dear Chair Raatz and Members of the Senate Committee on Education and Career Development:

On behalf of the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), I write to respectfully oppose SB 199. CCIA is an international, not-for-profit trade association representing a broad cross-section of communications and technology firms.<sup>1</sup> Proposed regulations on the interstate provision of digital services therefore can have a significant impact on CCIA members.

CCIA firmly believes that children are entitled to greater security and privacy online. Our members have designed and developed settings and parental tools to individually tailor younger users' online use to their developmental needs. For example, various services allow parents to set time limits, provide enhanced privacy protections by default for known child users, and other tools allow parents to block specific sites entirely.<sup>2</sup> This is also why CCIA supports implementing digital citizenship curricula in schools, to not only educate children on proper social media use but also help teach parents how they can use existing mechanisms and tools to protect their children as they see fit.<sup>3</sup>

However, protecting children from harm online does not include a generalized power to restrict ideas to which one may be exposed. Lawful speech cannot be suppressed solely to protect young online users from ideas or images that a legislative body disfavors.<sup>4</sup> While CCIA shares the goal of increasing online safety, this bill presents the following concerns.

## The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down laws containing speech restrictions intended to prevent harm to minors.

In 1997, the Supreme Court held that "the First Amendment does not tolerate" laws that "reduce[] the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children."<sup>5</sup> Yet SB 199 effectively does exactly this: in order to restrict access to content potentially harmful to children, the

<sup>1</sup> For more than 50 years, CCIA has promoted open markets, open systems, and open networks. CCIA members employ more than 1.6 million workers, invest more than \$100 billion in research and development, and contribute trillions of dollars in productivity to the global economy. A list of CCIA members is available at <https://www.ccianet.org/members>.

<sup>2</sup> Competitive Enterprise Institute, *Children Online Safety Tools*, <https://cei.org/children-online-safety-tools/> (last updated June 10, 2025).

<sup>3</sup> Jordan Rodell, *Why Implementing Education is a Logical Starting Point for Children's Safety Online*, Disruptive Competition Project (Feb. 7, 2023), <https://project-disco.org/privacy/020723-why-implementing-education-is-a-logical-starting-point-for-childrens-safety-online/>.

<sup>4</sup> *Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville*, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975). See also *FCC v. Pacifica Found.* 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978); *Pinkus v. United States*, 436 U.S. 293, 296–98 (1978).

<sup>5</sup> *Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 888 (1997) (cleaned up).



proposed bill would restrict both children and adults' access to such content. The First Amendment applies to teens as well as adults,<sup>6</sup> and to content posted on social media.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the Court has held that “The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits”<sup>8</sup> — harms associated with social media use do not grant a state the authority to restrict access to it. Nor do states have the authority to require parental consent for such viewing; the Court has likewise rejected the argument that “the state has the power to prevent children from hearing or saying anything without their parents’ prior consent.”<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the proposed bills unconstitutionally undermine established free speech protections for users of all ages.

### **SB 199’s requirements undermine user privacy for users of all ages.**

SB 199 contains many requirements that undermine privacy for all users. While well-meaning, age verification mandates inherently require collecting sensitive data about users and adults. Such policies run contrary to the data minimization principles underlying federal and international best practices for privacy protection.<sup>10</sup> Requiring individuals to share sensitive personal information with third parties, including IDs or biometrics, can make recipients a prime target for identity theft, cyberattacks, or other data breaches.<sup>11</sup>

Such dangers are far from hypothetical: Several of the most devastating data breaches in recent years are directly attributable to age verification requirements.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, government officials could access this sensitive data through enforcement inquiries and processes. Compounding these problems, the bill requires covered online services to retroactively verify the ages of existing users as well as prospective ones, which unnecessarily increases the risk of malicious actors accessing the data submitted.

### **To avoid restricting teens’ access to information, SB 199 should regulate users under 13 rather than 18 in accordance with established practices.**

SB 199 defines “child” as an individual less than 14, and “adolescent” as an individual who is at least 14 years of age but less than 18. Due to the nuanced ways in which children under the age of 18 use the internet, it is imperative to appropriately tailor such treatments to respective age groups. For example, if a 16-year-old is conducting research for a school project, it is expected that they would come across, learn from, and discern from a wider array of materials

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 855-56.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., *Packingham v. North Carolina*, 582 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2017).

<sup>8</sup> *United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).

<sup>9</sup> *Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n*, 564 U.S. 786, 795 n. 3 (2011).

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., *Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)*, Fed. Privacy Council, <https://www.fpc.gov/resources/fipps/>; Principle (c): Data Minimisation, U.K. Info. Comm’r Off., <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/data-protection-principles/a-guide-to-the-data-protection-principles/data-minimisation/>.

<sup>11</sup> Shoshana Weissman, *Age-Verification Legislation Discourages Data Minimization, Even When Legislators Don’t Intend That*, R St. Inst. (May 24, 2023), <https://www.rstreet.org/commentary/age-verification-legislation-discourages-data-minimization-even-when-legislators-dont-intend-that/>.

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., Mark Tsagas, *Online Age Checking Is Creating a Treasure Trove of Data for Hackers*, The Conversation (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://theconversation.com/online-age-checking-is-creating-a-treasure-trove-of-data-for-hackers-268586>.

than a 7-year-old on the internet playing video games. We would suggest changing the scope of covered users to be minors under the age of 13 to align with the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) standard.<sup>13</sup> This would also allow for those over 13, who use the internet much differently than their younger peers, to continue to benefit from its resources.

### **If enacted, SB 199 may result in denying services to all users under 18, limiting their access to needed supportive communities.**

The lack of narrowly tailored definitions, as discussed above, could incentivize businesses to simply prohibit minors from using digital services rather than face potential legal action and hefty fines for non-compliance. Requiring businesses to deny access to social networking sites or other online resources may also unintentionally restrict children’s ability to access and connect with like-minded individuals and communities. For example, children of certain minority groups may not live in an area where they can easily connect with others that represent and relate to their own unique experiences, so an online central meeting place where kids can share their experiences and find support can have positive impacts.<sup>14</sup>

The connected nature of social media has led some to allege that online services may be negatively impacting teenagers’ mental health. However, researchers explain that this theory is not well supported by existing evidence and repeats a ‘moral panic’ argument frequently associated with new technologies and modes of communication. Instead, social media effects are nuanced,<sup>15</sup> individualized, reciprocal over time, and gender-specific.

As explained above, CCIA believes that an alternative to solving these complex issues is to work with businesses to continue their ongoing private efforts to implement mechanisms such as daily time limits or child-safe searching so that parents can have control over their own child’s social media use.

### **Currently available tools to conduct age determination are imperfect in estimating users’ ages.**

There is no perfect method of age determination, and the more data a method collects, the greater risk it poses to consumer privacy<sup>16</sup> and small business sustainability.<sup>17</sup> A recent Digital Trust & Safety Partnership (DTSP) report, *Age Assurance: Guiding Principles and Best Practices*, contains more information regarding guiding principles for age assurance and how digital services have used such principles to develop best practices.<sup>18</sup> The report found that “smaller companies may not be able to sustain their business” if forced to implement costly age

<sup>13</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1).

<sup>14</sup> *The Importance of Belonging: Developmental Context of Adolescence*, Boston Children’s Hospital Digital Wellness Lab (Oct. 2024), <https://digitalwellnesslab.org/research-briefs/young-peoples-sense-of-belonging-online/>.

<sup>15</sup> Amy Orben et al., *Social Media’s Enduring Effect on Adolescent Life Satisfaction*, PNAS (May 6, 2019), <https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1902058116>.

<sup>16</sup> Kate Ruane, *CDT Files Brief in NetChoice v. Bonta Highlighting Age Verification Technology Risks* (Feb. 10, 2025), <https://cdt.org/insights/cdt-files-brief-in-netchoice-v-bonta-highlighting-age-verification-technology-risks/>.

<sup>17</sup> Engine, *More Than Just a Number: How Determining User Age Impacts Startups* (Aug. 2024), <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/66ad1ff867b7114cc6f16b00/1722621944736/More+Than+Just+A+Number+-+Updated+August+2024.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> *Age Assurance: Guiding Principles and Best Practices*, Digital Trust & Safety Partnership (Sept. 2023), [https://dtspartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/DTSP\\_Age-Assurance-Best-Practices.pdf](https://dtspartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/DTSP_Age-Assurance-Best-Practices.pdf).



verification methods, and that “[h]ighly accurate age assurance methods may depend on collection of new personal data such as facial imagery or government-issued ID.”<sup>19</sup>

Additionally, age verification software does not process all populations with equal accuracy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently published a report evaluating six software-based age estimation and age verification tools that estimate a person’s age based on the physical characteristics evident in a photo of their face.<sup>20</sup> The report notes that facial age estimation accuracy is strongly influenced by algorithm, sex, image quality, region-of-birth, age itself, and interactions between those factors, with false positive rates varying across demographics, generally being higher in women compared to men. CCIA encourages lawmakers to consider the current technological limitations in providing reliably accurate age estimation tools across all demographic groups.

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We appreciate the Committee’s consideration of these comments and stand ready to provide additional information as the Legislature considers proposals related to technology policy.

Sincerely,

Megan Stokes  
State Policy Director  
Computer & Communications Industry Association

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 10.

<sup>20</sup> Kayee Hanaoka et al., *Face Analysis Technology Evaluation: Age Estimation and Verification (NIST IR 8525)*, Nat’l Inst. Standards & Tech. (May 30, 2024), <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8525>.