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Proposed Amendments to Korea's Network Act to Control Content

South Korea is actively developing revisions to its **Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. (Network Act)**¹, to introduce new content control rules. These measures are designed to target large online service suppliers that offer consumer-facing interactive services, including numerous U.S.-based firms, by compelling them to police not simply illegal content but also vaguely defined “false or manipulated information.” This proposal would require firms to institute procedures to respond to complaints, take down offending content, generate reports, and respond to governmental investigations. Non-compliance could lead to government probes and significant fines. The initiative explicitly draws inspiration from the **EU Digital Services Act (DSA)**,² and would mirror the DSA’s flaws if enacted, creating substantial trade obstacles while threatening core U.S. interests and fundamental principles of free speech.³

Although no official draft of the legislation has been publicly released, CCIA has obtained a non-public draft developed by the **Korean Communications Commission (KCC)** that raises several concerns noted below. Press and industry reports indicate that legislation could move quickly, as it is a priority of the Lee Administration (which holds a comfortable majority in Korea’s national Assembly).

Background to the Proposal

On September 18, the ruling Democratic Party’s Special Committee of Media Reform announced⁴ that it would pursue a bill inspired by the EU’s Digital Services Act to combat ‘misinformation’, citing YouTube as a specific target in the dissemination of ‘fake news’. Examples of deepfakes of politicians and rumors connected to celebrities were cited as rationales. Efforts to institute such controls are not new and have long met with resistance from civil society in Korea.⁵

This current approach focuses on amending one of Korea’s key consumer protection measures applicable to communication networks, administered by the KCC, which has jurisdiction over telecommunications and broadcasting. The obligations will apply to large-scale “information

¹https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=38422&lang=ENG

²<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250918125400001>

³For more on the DSA’s flaws, see here https://ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CCIA_Comments-for-the-2025-USTR-National-Trade-Estimate-Report.pdf#page=104.

⁴<https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/09/19/ZBS4LFED5RCHXO7WN4YV2O3KCY/#:~:text=The%20committee%20stated%20in%20a,be%20determined%20through%20court%20proceedings.%E2%80%9D>

⁵<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/10/world/asia/south-korea-fake-news-disinformation.html#:~:text=In%20South%20Korea%2C%20conservatives%20and,to%20muzzle%20unfriendly%20news%20outlets>.

and communication service suppliers,”⁶ an extremely broad category that essentially applies to any online service: “an information and communications system for collecting, processing, storing, searching, transmitting or receiving information by using telecommunications.” Given the goal of the measure, it would predominantly apply to any online service that allows for the public posting of information--i.e., social media and interactive video services, blogs and podcasts, but could also apply to any service that allows for user comments.

Discriminatory Impact on U.S. Companies

The draft measure would apply to “large-scale” suppliers, a term to be defined through a subsequent Presidential decree, but which is described in the draft as intending to cover services with “millions of users.” Based on government remarks,⁷ however, the platforms most likely to fall under this category are likely to be significantly, if not predominantly, U.S. firms (with YouTube consistently cited as a prominent example).⁸ Depending on final definitions and enforcement priorities, the effect of this measure could be discriminatory and unfairly burdensome for American businesses operating in Korea.

Vague and Excessive Content Controls

Rather than relying on existing laws and enforcement structures that already address defined, unlawful content, the Proposed Measures would require platforms to create systems for restricting “false manipulated information.” The definition is extremely broad, covering content generated with “intent to mislead” for “economic or political benefit,” particularly when designed to “influence elections” or “distort public opinion.” This scope clearly encompasses political expression and legitimate public debate, signaling that the measure is politically motivated and subject to abuse.

Penalties and State Pressure on Expression

The KCC would be authorized to inspect platforms’ content management systems and impose administrative fines reaching up to **4%** of local revenue for violations. Given the vague definitions, platforms would be incentivized to err on the side of over-removal, silencing lawful but sensitive speech to minimize risk. Moreover, by prescribing rigid, government-monitored compliance systems, the measures would discourage innovation in content moderation approaches. Ultimately, this framework empowers the Korean government to use regulatory threats as leverage to pressure platforms into suppressing content that may be politically inconvenient, deputizing private firms to enforce state censorship.

⁶See Article 2.1 of the Act, available here:

https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=38422&lang=ENG

⁷<https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250820/push-to-punish-fake-news-tests-limits-of-free-press-in-korea>

⁸“The purpose is to solve the problems of false and manipulated information being spread indiscriminately on large platforms like YouTube, and of certain celebrities being harmed and turned into a means of making money for some YouTubers.” Quote by ruling party representative Lee Ju-hee, available at: <https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8345505&ref=A>

Local Agent Mandate

The draft proposal would oblige covered platforms without a physical office in Korea to designate a domestic representative. The U.S. International Trade Commission has previously warned⁹ that local presence requirements, when paired with content moderation mandates, can become a tool for government censorship. Depending on implementation, this provision could also be inconsistent with Korea's obligations under the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.¹⁰ While Korea would argue that the measure does not technically require a foreign firm to establish a juridical presence in Korea, the requirement for the agent to assume liability for the behavior of the U.S. firm is tantamount to requiring residence, and thus clearly violates the spirit if not the letter of the local presence rule. Furthermore, given the strong likelihood that potential local representatives would be unwilling to accept such liability, affected companies might be forced to assign responsibilities to employees established locally.

Economic and Political Consequences

As noted above, the Proposed Measures, which appear to be pushed on an urgent basis with little or no public input,¹¹ appear intended to replicate the EU's DSA framework. A 2025 CCIA study¹² estimated that the DSA costs businesses roughly \$750 million annually in compliance expenses, not counting exposure to investigations and penalties. Adopting a similar approach in Korea would impose substantial burdens; extrapolating from EU estimates, this could result in annual compliance costs of over **\$300 million** across U.S. companies expected to be in scope, with a plausible range of \$288-325 million. This figure combines baseline obligations under Korea's existing Network Act (about \$175 million) with an incremental \$113-150 million from the newly proposed DSA-like amendments. Importing this model would impose comparable, unnecessary costs on U.S. service providers, while adopting a regulatory philosophy fundamentally at odds with shared U.S.-Korea democratic values.

This initiative also reflects a broader trend of restrictive digital policies in Korea. Similar measures have already been flagged as major trade barriers in the **USTR's 2025 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report**¹³ and in a recent **letter**¹⁴ signed by 43 members of Congress. These concerns are heightened by the fact that, after the July 30, 2025, announcement¹⁵ of the U.S.-Korea trade agreement, Korean officials claimed to have safeguarded against digital trade restrictions and promised "no further concessions."¹⁶ Advancing the Proposed Measures now appears to contradict those assurances, raising doubts about Korea's commitment to recent trade commitments and threatening to strain bilateral relations.

⁹<https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5244.pdf>

¹⁰<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text>

¹¹See Lee Ju-hee's recent quote, *supra* note 8: "'We will push for the enactment of a Korean version of the DSA law as quickly as possible while not missing the current momentum of media reform being promoted by the Democratic Party of Korea.'"

¹²<https://ccianet.org/research/reports/costs-to-us-companies-from-eu-digital-services-regulation/>

¹³<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2025NTE.pdf>

¹⁴<https://adriansmith.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/adriansmith.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/7.1.2025-final-korea-digital-trade-letter.pdf>

¹⁵<https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114944494894008041>

¹⁶<https://www.fnnews.com/news/202507311808334723>



Attachment: Draft Bill to Amend “Network Act”, September 2025

[September 2025 Draft]

Proposed Amendment to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. *(Proposed by Rep. OOO and others)*

Reason for Proposal and Main Contents

Illegal information as defined in Article 44-7 of the "Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc." (hereinafter referred to as the "Information and Communications Network Act") is widely circulated on large-scale platforms, i.e., information and communications networks operated and managed by large-scale information and communications service providers, which are used by millions of users (hereinafter referred to as "large-scale information and communications networks"). However, current measures are limited to administrative sanctions based on deliberation by the Korea Communications Standards Commission. Such administrative deliberation and sanctions have sparked controversy, with critics arguing that government intervention in the realm of freedom of expression, a constitutional fundamental right forming the basis of democratic order, is problematic. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the volume of illegal information deliberated is very small and the speed of action is slow, indicating limitations in processing efficiency.

The EU's "Digital Services Act" (hereinafter referred to as "DSA"), enacted to protect individual fundamental rights from the circulation of illegal information and unilateral platform services to platform users, requires platforms to take measures such as deletion or blocking of advertising revenue in accordance with their autonomous operating policies. Administrative agencies receive transparency reports from large platforms detailing their actions against illegal information or impose administrative fines on large platforms that do not operate such systems. The DSA differs significantly from Korea's Information and Communications Network Act system, as it is a legal framework that indirectly observes and supports the activation of self-regulatory systems of large platforms rather than administrative bodies directly deliberating and sanctioning individual illegal content.

Therefore, this amendment seeks to introduce a DSA-like self-regulatory system into the Information and Communications Network Act to prevent the widespread dissemination of illegal information. This involves requiring large-scale information and communications service providers to promptly take measures such as marking illegal information, blocking advertising revenue, or deleting all or part of content, in accordance with their autonomous operating policies. The Korea Communications Commission shall regularly receive transparency reports analyzing the operation and content of such self-regulatory systems from large-scale information and communications service providers. It will exercise an indirect administrative oversight function, imposing administrative sanctions, specifically an administrative fine calculated as a certain percentage of sales, only on large platforms that do not operate such systems. However, as the introduction and maintenance of such systems would impose a significant burden on small-scale information and communications service providers, these reporting and action systems are required only for large platforms, i.e., large-scale information and communications service providers, that meet specific criteria such as user numbers and sales.

Furthermore, the act of distributing false manipulated information—illegal information defined as information produced and disseminated with the intent to mislead other users into believing it is true, while knowing it is false, for the purpose of monetary or economic gain—on information and communications networks provided by large-scale information and communications service providers, causes widespread harm to society, unlike the dissemination of general illegal information. Moreover, the extent of damage suffered by victims due to malicious dissemination of illegal information with the intent to harm others is incomparably more severe than defamation or infringement of rights resulting from general illegal information dissemination.

Nevertheless, Article 750 of the Civil Act, which is the general basis for tort liability, states that "a person who causes damage to another by an unlawful act, intentionally or negligently, shall be liable for compensation for such damage," thereby limiting the scope of compensation to actual damages. It does not consider punitive elements necessary from the perspective of the social community, such as whether the perpetrator intended to harm the victim, the scale of the damage, or whether compensation was recklessly delayed making victim recovery more difficult, nor does it consider the perceived extent of damage from the victim's perspective.

Therefore, in cases where a person causes harm to another on a large-scale information and communications network by violating the prohibition of illegal information distribution under Article 44-7 with the intent to harm them, they shall be liable for damages three times the amount of typical tort damages.

In addition, some large-scale information and communications service providers do not have an address or business establishment in Korea. In such cases, these large-scale information and communications service providers must appoint a domestic agent in Korea. This agent must be delegated external authority to handle matters necessary for compliance with and enforcement of this Act, either jointly with the provider or on its behalf. The domestic agent must also be provided with the internal authority and means necessary to comply with and enforce this Act.

Meanwhile, even false information is, in principle, subject to protection under the constitutional freedom of expression. Overcoming it through mutual criticism in the information market aligns with the constitutional spirit that establishes freedom of expression as a fundamental right supporting democratic basic order. Therefore, this amendment aims to effectively address the harms of false information through the autonomous response system of large-scale information and communications service providers. This will be achieved by supporting media organizations and human rights groups engaged in fact-checking activities for false information circulated on large-scale information and communications networks, and by enabling them to provide the results of their fact-checking activities to large-scale information and communications service providers.

However, false manipulated information circulated on large-scale information and communications networks, which have a large number of users and fast information dissemination speeds, can greatly influence the formation of public opinion. Its harms are significant, as it distorts the normal formation of public opinion and amplifies political and social conflicts. Thus, it requires a special response at the level of constitutional ideology, beyond merely overcoming false information through mutual criticism in the realm of simple freedom of expression, to uphold the constitutional order. A representative recent example of

false manipulated information, the election fraud conspiracy theory, is intentionally produced and disseminated despite clear recognition of its falsity. This is done for purposes such as monetary gain (e.g., advertising revenue on information and communications networks, political donations) or political gain (e.g., justifying illegal insurrection, consolidating political support). The forces behind the December 3rd insurrection and their supporters exploited the false manipulated information, the "election fraud conspiracy theory," as a justification for illegal insurrection. Furthermore, it was misused as a mechanism for extreme violence, going beyond hatred and ridicule towards the Constitutional Court, which was responsible for impeaching those involved in the illegal insurrection, and the courts that issued warrants for them.

Therefore, for false manipulated information that is misused as a mechanism to foster forces destructive to democratic basic order, such as when it is disseminated with the intent to influence elections, or when it distorts social opinion formation and its impact is significant, or when it incites hatred or violence against constitutional institutions like the National Assembly, Constitutional Court, courts, or National Election Commission, or when it incites or supports criminal acts punishable by imprisonment or heavier penalties, the provisions concerning "reporting and measures" and the submission of transparency reports under Article 44-12 and 44-15 shall apply mutatis mutandis to large-scale information and communications service providers for response.

Bill Number Date of Proposal: Proposer: Representative

Act No. [] Partial Amendment to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc.

The Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. shall be partially amended as follows:

Article 2, Paragraph 1, shall have Sub-paragraphs 3-2 and 3-3 newly inserted as follows:

3-2. "Large-scale Information and Communications Service Provider" refers to an information and communications service provider under Sub-paragraph 3 whose daily average number of users, sales, type of business, etc., meet the criteria prescribed by Presidential Decree. 3-3. "False Manipulated Information" refers to information that a person, knowing it to be false, produces and disseminates with the intent to manipulate other information users into believing it to be true, for the purpose of economic or political gain.

Article 32-5, Paragraph 1, Sub-paragraph 4, and Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be newly inserted as follows, and Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 shall become Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, respectively:

4. Measures taken in response to illegal information, false information, and false manipulated information (hereinafter referred to as "illegal information, etc.") under Articles 44-12 through 44-19.

② A person who has designated a domestic agent pursuant to Paragraph 1 shall delegate external authority to the domestic agent to handle matters necessary for the compliance and enforcement of this Act, either jointly with the delegator or on the delegator's behalf. The delegator shall also provide the domestic agent with the internal authority and means necessary for the domestic agent to comply with and enforce this Act. ③ A person designated as a domestic agent pursuant to Paragraph 1 may be held liable for non-fulfillment of obligations under this Act, irrespective of responsibilities and legal actions that may be raised against the designating person.

Article 44-10 shall be amended as follows:

Article 44-10 (Dispute Mediation Division) ① The Korea Communications Commission shall establish a Dispute Mediation Division composed of five or fewer members to efficiently carry out dispute mediation for information circulated through information and communications networks that infringes on others' rights, such as invasion of privacy or defamation, or constitutes illegal information, etc.. At least one of these members shall be a person qualified as an attorney.

② The members of the Dispute Mediation Division referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Korea Communications Commission with the consent of the Korea Communications Commission. ③ Other necessary matters concerning the establishment, operation, and dispute mediation of the Dispute Mediation Division shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Articles 44-11 through 44-19 shall be newly inserted as follows:

Article 44-11 (Claim for Treble Damages) ① A person who causes harm to another by violating the prohibition of illegal information distribution under Article 44-7 with false manipulated information, with the intent to harm, on an information and communications network operated and managed by a large-scale information and communications service provider as defined in Article 3-2, shall be liable to compensate the other person for damages within the scope not exceeding three times the amount of the damage.

② The court, when determining the amount of compensation under Paragraph 1, shall consider the following matters:

1. The degree of intent to harm another and awareness of the risk of damage occurrence.
2. The scale of damage suffered by the victim and others due to the distribution of illegal information.

3. The economic gain acquired by the perpetrator due to the distribution of illegal information.
4. The degree of criminal punishment and administrative fine imposed due to the distribution of illegal information.
5. The duration and frequency of illegal information distribution.
6. The financial status of the perpetrator.
7. The degree of effort made by the perpetrator to remedy the damage. ③ If the court determines that the State and local governments, the President, heads of local governments, members of the National Assembly, city/county/district council members, companies belonging to a corporate group subject to public disclosure under Article 31, Paragraph 1 of the 「Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act」, and large enterprises not corresponding to small and medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the 「Small and Medium Enterprises Basic Act」 and their executives, are filing a claim for damages under this Article with the intent to restrict critical expression against themselves, the court may deem this an abuse of the right to sue and dismiss the part of the claim exceeding the scope of general damages.

Article 44-12 (Reporting and Measures for Illegal Information, Autonomous Operating Policies, etc.) ① Anyone may report illegal information under Article 44-7 circulated on an

information and communications network operated and managed by a large-scale information and communications service provider as defined in Article 2, Paragraph 1, Sub-paragraph 3-2, to the large-scale information and communications service provider.

② When making a report under Paragraph 1, the specific location of the information considered illegal under Article 44-7, the reasons and basis for it being illegal information, the name and email address of the reporter, and an affirmation that the report is true, shall be stated in the report. The large-scale information and communications service provider shall notify the reporter of receipt after receiving the report.

③ After careful consideration, if there is a legitimate reason to impose the restrictions in the following subparagraphs, the large-scale information and communications service provider shall take the measures in the following subparagraphs regarding the relevant information. The provider shall also notify the reporter and the information poster of the reason for the measure and the appeal procedures.

1. Deletion or blocking access to the relevant information, or restriction of information exposure.

2. Suspension or termination of the information poster's account.
3. Restriction on monetization, such as advertising revenue.
4. Restriction on cessation or termination of monetary payments.
5. Suspension or termination of all or part of the service.
6. Marking as harmful information to youth.
7. Other measures stipulated in the large-scale information and communications service provider's autonomous operating policies under Paragraph 5.

④ The reporter or information poster may, within six months from the date of receiving notification of measures under Paragraph 3, file an appeal free of charge. The large-scale information and communications service provider may overturn its decision if the appeal is well-founded.

⑤ The reporter or information poster may contest the decision on the appeal under Paragraph 4 through the dispute mediation procedure under Article 44-10 or through litigation.

⑥ A large-scale information and communications service provider may establish autonomous operating policies regarding the criteria for determining illegal information, and the procedures for reporting and taking measures, by referring to the self-regulation guidelines of information and communications service provider associations under Article 44-4.

⑦ A large-scale information and communications service provider shall reflect the opinions of civil society organizations or expert groups when establishing autonomous operating policies under Paragraph 6.

Article 44-13 (Measures for Abuse of Reporting) If a large-scale information and communications service provider determines that a reporter is abusing the reporting system, such as by frequently submitting reports that are clearly unfounded, considering the following subparagraphs, the provider may, after prior warning, suspend the measures under Article 44-12, Paragraph 3, for a reasonable period.

1. The number of reports determined to be clearly unfounded during a certain period.
2. The ratio of the number in Sub-paragraph 1 to the total number of information provided or reported during the period in Sub-paragraph 1.
3. The nature of the illegal information and the extent to which the outcome of reporting abuse affects victims and society.
4. If identifiable, the intent of the reporter who abused the reporting.

Article 44-14 (Protection of Media Information) If the poster or author of information reported under Article 44-12, Paragraph 1, is a 'media' as defined in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the 「Act on Press Arbitration and Remedies for Damages, etc.」, the large-scale information and

communications service provider cannot take the measures listed in each subparagraph of Article 44-12, Paragraph 3.

Article 44-15 (Publication of Transparency Report) A large-scale information and communications service provider shall, at least once every six months, prepare a report containing the following information (hereinafter referred to as a "transparency report") and publish it in an easily accessible manner and in a machine-readable format.

1. Daily average number of users, sales, and type of business.
2. Classification of reported illegal information according to the types in Article 44-7, the number of each reported case, and the number of cases processed and measures taken accordingly.
3. The number and results of appeals and appeal processing under Article 44-12, Paragraph 4.
4. The content and number of orders or recommendations received from national agencies, including the Korea Communications Commission, regarding illegal information, and measures taken in accordance with such orders or recommendations.
5. Other types, numbers, and measures of information processed according to the terms and conditions, policies, or self-regulation guidelines of the large-scale information and communications service provider.
6. Other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 44-16 (Oversight by the Korea Communications Commission) ① The Korea Communications Commission may request an information and communications service provider to submit its current status regarding the daily average number of users, sales, and type of business to verify whether it meets the criteria under Article 2, Paragraph 1, Sub-paragraph 3-2. ② The Korea Communications Commission may conduct investigations concerning the operation of reporting and self-regulatory measures by large-scale information and communications service providers under Article 44-12. ③ If the investigation under Paragraph 2 reveals that a large-scale information and communications service provider has not operated the system under this Act, the Korea Communications Commission may impose an administrative fine not exceeding an amount calculated by multiplying the domestic sales, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, by four hundredths (4%). In this case, the following matters shall be considered:

1. The reason and extent of not operating the system under this Act.
2. The period and frequency of not operating the system under this Act.
3. The scale of profits acquired from the act of not operating the system under this Act.

Article 44-17 (Support for Fact-Checking Activities for False Manipulated Information) ① A large-scale information and communications service provider shall establish and operate

autonomous policies for handling false information or false manipulated information, by referring to Articles 44-4 and 44-12. ② Fact-checking organizations that comply with international norms regarding fact-checking procedures, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, shall verify and confirm false information or false manipulated information circulated on large-scale information and communications networks and publicly disclose their findings. ③ A large-scale information and communications service provider may reflect the publicly disclosed findings under Paragraph 2 in its service, in accordance with its policies for handling false information or false manipulated information under Paragraph 1. ④ A large-scale information and communications service provider shall publicly announce to information and communications service users the fact that it has reflected the publicly disclosed findings under Paragraph 2 in its service. ⑤ A large-scale information and communications service provider may enter into agreements with media organizations and other fact-checking organizations to promote fact-checking activities for false information or false manipulated information.

Article 44-18 (Establishment of Transparency Center, etc.) ① An "Information and Communications Service Transparency Center" may be established under the Korea Communications Commission to oversee large-scale information and communications service providers under this Act and to support the activities of "fact-checking organizations." ② The Information and Communications Service Transparency Center shall perform the following tasks to promote fact-checking activities:

1. Operation and support of a database of publicly disclosed findings from fact-checking organizations.
2. Support for fact-checking organizations.
3. Support for research and education on fact-checking.
4. International cooperation for promoting fact-checking.
5. Other projects related to promoting fact-checking as prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Article 44-19 (Measures for False Manipulated Information) ① Articles 44-12 and 44-15 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the following false manipulated information. In this case, 'illegal information' in those provisions shall be understood as 'false manipulated information.'

1. When disseminated with the intent to influence elections.
2. When distorting the formation of social public opinion and its impact is significant.
3. When inciting hatred or acts of violence against constitutional institutions such as the National Assembly, Constitutional Court, courts, or National Election Commission.
4. When inciting criminal acts punishable by imprisonment or heavier penalties.
5. Other cases of disseminating false manipulated information that may cause significant harm to the democratic basic order, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. ② The Korea

Communications Commission shall investigate whether large-scale information and communications service providers operate the system under Paragraph 1 concerning false manipulated information, and shall publish the results of such investigation.

Article 76, Paragraph 2, Sub-paragraph 4-3 shall be amended as follows:

4-3. A person who has not taken necessary measures pursuant to Article 32-5.

Addendum Article 1 (Effective Date) This Act shall enter into force one year after the date of its promulgation.